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Abstract. Definitions are crucial for institutional analysis. This article explains the
nature of taxonomic definitions, with particular attention to their use in
economics and other social sciences. Taxonomic definitions demarcate one species
of entity from another. They are vital for the communication of meaning between
scientists, who must share some basic conception of what types of entity they are
investigating, to establish a division of labour over subsequent theoretical analysis
and empirical investigation of the type of entity defined. Generally, taxonomic
definitions build on past usage and are parsimonious: they are not meant to be
explanations or descriptions. By contrast, overloaded taxonomic definitions can
create square-one disagreement about what is being investigated. As illustrative
examples, the paper considers different degrees of progress with attempts to define
firms, markets and institutions.
1. Introduction
The social sciences are plagued with severe and unresolved problems of
definition.1 Although there will always be some ambiguity and fuzziness, there
is a failure in some parts of social science to develop adequate common
understandings of terms. Some scholars have argued that definitional tasks
should be abandoned. Yet without workable definitions, science can make little
progress. Accordingly, when a researcher uses the word ‘institution’, he or she
should be able to point with adequate lucidity to the type of phenomena to which
the term is attached.
Among and beyond those that attempt definitions, there is little discussion of
their possible nature and requirements. There is little recognition that several
different types of definition have been identified in philosophy. It is sometimes
∗Corresponding author. Email: geoff@vivarais.co.uk
1 The author is very grateful to Ricardo Crespo, Steve Fleetwood, David Gindis, Claudius Gra¨bner,
Francesco Guala, Matthias Klaes, Chris Mantzavinos and anonymous referees for discussions and very
helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
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suggested that definitions should express everything vital about the phenomenon
defined. Such a task would be impossible, and is refuted by examples of effective
taxonomic definitions, such as ‘a mammal is a clade of animal where the females
suckles their young’. This parsimonious but effective definition omits numerous
vital features of mammals.
Taxonomic definitions identify the minimum number of properties that are
sufficient to demarcate one group of entities from all other entities. Their role is
to demarcate the kind of entity to which a label refers, not to express in detail
the nature of that kind.
These definitions are established through social practice in varied contexts.
Consider a merchant who wishes sell wine inside the European Union (EU).
To label the product as ‘wine’, the merchant must comply with the taxonomic
definition of the liquid in EU law. This is ‘the product obtained exclusively
from the total or partial alcoholic fermentation of fresh grapes, whether
or not crushed, or of grape must’ (EU Council, 2008). This taxonomic
definition does not tell us that the wine is a liquid and it must be
drinkable. There is no mention of its possible range of alcoholic strength,
or of its culturally significant consumption with meals or in religious rites.
These important features of wine are omitted. Yet this taxonomic definition
plays the effective demarcatory role of excluding fermentations from other
fruits or substances. The practical efficacy of this demarcation is a vital
test of a taxonomic definition, and experience can lead to its refinement
or revision.
Similar considerations apply in science. Science is a social process,
wherein communication and understanding are vital. Scientists need to
interact with one another and establish common understandings, including
of the terms being used. This transmission of meaning is vital for
scientific advance.
Taxonomic definitions are classifications. There is a sociological literature
on classification systems that emphasizes their ubiquity in human society. This
work shows that classifications are affected by culture, are dynamic, and often
affect the (human or material) objects of classification, by determining how we
treat them. As Geoffrey Bowker and Susan Leigh Starr (1999: 67) put it in
their definitive contribution in this area: ‘There is no great divide between folk
and scientific classifications.’ Maybe so, but science is more than folklore, and
we are concerned here with the categories that are used to advance scientific
understanding.
For example, investigation of the (true or false) claim that ‘capitalism generates
inequality’ requires an adequate common understanding of what is meant by
‘capitalism’ and ‘inequality’. If there were some dispute over whether or not
to include (say) prehistoric trade, ancient Rome, or the former Soviet Union
under the category ‘capitalist’, then attempts to critique or justify the inequality
claim would be confounded by major differences over what entities were being
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analysed, thus frustrating the search for possible generic mechanisms that might
explain capitalist inequality.2
To get anywhere, participants in the dialogue need to establish some minimal
common understanding of a term such as ‘capitalism’, so that inquirers can
then identify possible causal mechanisms and place them under some kind of
empirical or other scrutiny. This is why taxonomic definitions are important.
Frustration with verbal definitions has been a motive for some social scientists
to turn to mathematics. But when mathematics is used, words are still required
for the ultimate communication of meanings and understandings (Frigg and
Nguyen, 2017; Morgan, 2012). Much scientific communication will always
involve ordinary language, with all its trappings and ambiguities.
Definitions in the social sciences are likely to have fuzzy boundaries. But
these are not excuses for abandoning the tasks of definition and the vital
communication of meaning. Absolute precision, like absolute cleanliness, is
impossible; but that does not imply that we should abandon our duties of
linguistic housekeeping or personal hygiene.
Scientists must first establish an agreed rough understanding of the phenomena
they are investigating. Then they try to focus on the problem, using a taxonomic
definition as a means of demarcation. They sometimes change this definition.
But definitions matter at every stage. Science is driven in part by a search for
meaning.
The importance of adequate definitions has been stressed by a number of
leading authors. Thomas Hobbes (1651: ch. 4) warned of the compounded
dangers of imprecise definitions. Thomas Robert Malthus (1827) made a
systematic attempt to define then-prominent concepts in political economy. He
argued that such definitions were different from those in mathematics and set
out some rules for their derivation (Machlup, 1963). Today there are numerous
attempts, including those in various specialist dictionaries and encyclopaedias,
to define key terms in the social sciences.3
But the search for absolute precision of basic terms would prevent science
getting off the ground. Physics managed to make substantial progress even when
the term ‘electron’ lacked a shared definition (Hacking, 1983). Many other terms
remain vague, even in the hard sciences. This has led to defences by philosophers
of some ‘vagueness’ in science (Hyde, 2008; Klaes, 2004, 2006; Russell, 1923).
The focus in this paper is on taxonomic definitions, which have the aim of
establishing sufficient agreement on the kind of object of enquiry signalled by a
2 Such wide-ranging inclusions under the category ‘capitalism’ have been suggested, by McCloskey
(2010: 16, 259), Runciman (1983) and Cliff (1955) respectively. See by contrast Hodgson (2015a), where
a narrower definition of capitalism is presented. It focuses on well-developed financial institutions and
markets, which became dominant in the West no earlier than the 17th century, but were marginalized or
absent in Soviet-style economies.
3 For example, Abercrombie et al. (2000), Durlauf and Blume (2008), Jary and Jary (1991), Marshall
(1998), Outhwaite and Bottomore (1994), and Williams (1976).
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term. They do not typically provide a further understanding of those phenomena.
Matthias Klaes (2006: 21) argued: ‘What matters for founding concepts is less
that they are well-defined, but that differences over their meaning do not prompt
controversy.’ The major role of a taxonomic formulation is precisely to minimize
controversy over the kind of objects under investigation. A taxonomic definition
does not have to be ‘well-defined’ in the sense that it provides an adequate
description, understanding or explanation of the entities involved.
Prominent attacks on definitions and ‘definitionism’ in philosophy claim that
definitions cannot adequately or unambiguously establish the nature of an entity
or kind (Fodor, 1998; Fodor et al., 1980; Klaes, 2006). But such a failing does
not apply to taxonomic definitions, which do not aim to provide an adequate
account of that nature. Their function is different, and they must be assessed in
their own terms.
This paper has nine sections. The following section briefly reviews different
types of definition and possible attributes of definitions. Taxonomic definitions
are considered in the light of these classifications. Section 3 notes that in biology
a taxonomic definition may be established by considering branches in the tree
of evolutionary descent. But the more tangled processes of evolution of socio-
economic phenomena thwart this approach. Section 4 considers alternative
ontological bases for taxonomic definitions. Section 5 discusses further how
taxonomic definitions may be established in practice. Sections 6, 7 and 8 are
case studies of relative failure or success in establishing consensus definitions
in social science. The definitions of firm, market and institution are considered
respectively. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2. Taxonomic and other categories of definition
There are different kinds of definition and different types of object of
definition. Furthermore, definitions serve different purposes. For example, a legal
redefinition ofmarriage to include same-sex couples may bemotivated by notions
of inclusivity or fairness, rather than a concern for scientific categorization. The
taxonomic definition of wine in EU law was not constructed to aid scientific
investigation, but to regulate trade.
Aristotle (1901: book 2, chs 8–10) distinguished between nominal and real
definitions. A real definition involves an explanation of the origin and nature of
a type of entity: it is an attempt to outline its essence and function. By contrast,
a nominal definition elaborates the meaning of the name that we use.
Clearly, a nominal definition is a necessary condition for attempting a real
definition. To attempt to investigate the nature of an object or object denoted
by X, we must first adopt a view of what class is denoted by X. As Carl
Hempel (1952: 17) pointed out, sciences cannot develop ‘without extensive use
of nominal definition’.
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But the use of a nominal definition does not imply a rejection of philosophical
realism – the view that a (social) world exists that is independent of our mind,
beliefs or senses. Nominal and real definitions are different kinds of definition,
each compatible with various philosophical outlooks. As Orna Harari (2005:
126) noted: ‘From an Aristotelian point of view the . . . notion of nominal
definition appeals to the essential features of an object.’ In other words, nominal
definitions can appeal to the realist concept of essence.
The term taxonomic definition is introduced here to denote a mode of nominal
definition that addresses not a single entity but a population of entities with some
common properties. A population invokes plurality: ‘There are many “beings”
in disjunctive diversity’ (Whitehead, 1929: 31). In biology the term population
has developed a technical meaning (Mayr 1972, 1982; Sober, 1980). As Peter
Godfrey-Smith (2009: 148) explained, ‘population thinking’ treats ‘a system as
an ensemble of individual things, which have some degree of autonomy and a
significant number of properties in common’.
Populations are commonplace in the social sciences. There are populations
of structures, cultures, ideologies, organizations, families, economies, states,
individuals and so on. Taxonomic definitions in social science concern
populations of social phenomena that exhibit some degree of commonality and
some degree of diversity. As in biology, social scientists are forever attempting
to classify phenomena in the face of endless diversity and change.
Sciences also contain populations of theories, which are clusters of theoretical
approaches with shared characteristics. Examples include postmodernism,
neoclassical economics, historical institutionalism and many more. These too
are objects of taxonomic definition.
The relatively sparse modern philosophical literature on definitions is
dominated by logicians and analytical philosophers. Because taxonomy concerns
varied entities, and taxonomies often have problems with fuzzy or unclear
boundaries, a classical logical treatment is often problematic. Fuzzy logic may
help, but so far it has been little used by logicians in this area (Zadeh, 1996).
Consequently, taxonomic definitions are relatively neglected in the philosophical
literature. A primary aim of this paper is to help to fill this void by bringing
pragmatic considerations into play.4
Richard Robinson (1950: 19) distinguished between ‘lexical and stipulative
definition. Here by “lexical definition” I mean reporting the customary or
dictionary meaning of a word, and by “stipulative definition” I mean establishing
or announcing one’s own meaning for a word’ (original emphasis). A lexical
definition must simply convey existing meaning, while a nominal definition may
involve some stipulation (and some departure from customary or dictionary
usages) to establish a more precise meaning of a term.
4 For the pragmatist challenge to analytic philosophy see for example Kitcher (2012).
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This lexical–stipulative distinction refers to the degree to which we may rely
on the baggage of meaning that a term may carry in pre-existing discourse.
When we invent an entirely new word or phrase to identify a class of entities,
we are being entirely stipulative. Alternatively, a stipulative definition may use
an already-existing term but stipulate a new meaning.
Many definitions in mathematics have a strongly stipulative character. Such
definitions ‘must simply be assumed or posited’ rather than accomplished
through observation (Demoss and Devereux, 1988: 137). For Gottlob Frege
(1914), all definitions in mathematics must be treated as purely stipulative.
But outside mathematics, there are problems with purely stipulative
definitions. Words (and perhaps even symbols) typically connote prior
understandings. It is difficult to get rid of all this baggage of meaning. Science
involves rhetorical persuasion in a social community (McCloskey, 1985). The
persuasive task becomes more difficult if we ask every reader to expunge all
preconceptions and pre-associations, and adopt a number of termswith strikingly
novel meanings.
Hence, as Robinson (1950: 80) argued: ‘The supreme rule of [definitional]
stipulation is surely to stipulate as little as possible’ (original emphasis). Similarly,
Aristotle wrote in his Topica (1853: II, 2): ‘we ought to use our terms to mean the
same things as most people mean by them.’ Malthus 1827: 4) argued likewise:
with terms ‘in the common conversation of educated persons, we should define
and apply them, so as to agree with the sense in which they are understood in this
ordinary use of them’. Malthus insisted that if a new definition is stipulated for
an existing term, then its advantages must necessarily be obvious to the reader.
Likewise, Alfred Marshall (1920: 43) argued that the terms used in economics
should ‘conform . . . to the familiar terms of everyday life, and so far as possible
[economists] must use them as they are commonly used’.5
But some contested terms in social science conjure a chaos of contradictory
meanings. Consequently, in these circumstances, reliance on lexical appeals is
problematic and some stipulation is unavoidable. In practice, given the subject
matter and the nature of language, most definitions in social science involve a
degree of lexical description and a degree of stipulation. A measure of stipulation
is often necessary because words are used in varied and ambiguous ways, and
we have to stipulate a more precise meaning. A degree of lexical description is
necessary because to be rhetorically effective, and to avoid over-burdening the
reader with radically novel stipulations, we are forced to rely on some established
meanings.
5 See also Wittgenstein (1958: 20): ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language.’ Notably,
following most other economists since Adam Smith, Marshall (1920) made an exception to his ‘everyday
life’ rule with his definition of capital in terms of factor inputs rather than the money-related meaning
used in business, with possible adverse consequences (Hodgson, 2014).
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Consider another type of definition. An intensional definition establishes the
meaning of a term by specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for when the
term should be used (Cook, 2009). For example, a triangle is defined as polygon
with three straight sides and three vertices. Being a polygon with three straight
sides and three vertices is both necessary and sufficient to be a triangle.
By contrast, the term extensional definition is used to refer to the listing
of everything that falls under that definition. Hence an extensional definition
of bachelor would be a listing of all the unmarried men in the world,
including maybe all unmarried men in the past and future! Given the numbers
of social phenomena, and the obvious difficulties of listing all types in a
class, extensional definitions are often impractical in social science. But some
extensional definitions are possible and can be useful. For example, ‘sub-Saharan
Africa’ may be defined simply by listing the 49 countries that are generally taken
to fall into this category. This performs a similar (but not identical) taxonomic
function to defining sub-Saharan Africa as ‘the area of the African continent that
lies south of the Sahara’.
But taxonomic definitions do not fit easily into the intensional–extensional
dichotomy. Typically, they are not extensional. They are closer to being
intensional, but they provide merely sufficient criteria to demarcate one species
from another.
To take stock of these issues, we consider that taxonomic definitions in social
science:
1. are generally nominal, rather than real in the sense used by Aristotle (but this
does not imply a rejection of philosophical realism),
2. are generally not intensional in the full sense of providing necessary and
sufficient properties to communicate the nature of an entity or type,
3. may be extensional but more frequently, for practical and other reasons, they
are not,
4. are often lexical to a large degree, and
5. typically involve a lower degree of stipulation than that found in mathematics.
In addition:
6. The purpose of taxonomic definitions is to establish sufficient shared meaning,
so that a class of entity can be investigated by a scientific community.
7. Taxonomic definition is not the same as an adequate description, explanation
or analysis of a class of types.
8. Some consensus on taxonomic classification is prior to such investigations, but
the taxonomic definition may be adjusted in the light of new understandings
as they emerge.
3. Taxonomic definitions and evolutionary descent
Having addressed their character, we now consider how taxonomic definitions
are established. Here social scientists can learn from biology, but there are
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important differences. Biology and the social sciences share the basic problem
of classifying species or types within a world of change and immense variety
(de Queiroz, 1994). It is often difficult to draw boundaries. But in at least one
important respect, the difficulties of definition and classification in the social
sphere are even greater than in biology. This is due to important differences in
the evolutionary processes involved in the two spheres.
Biology establishes taxonomic definitions with reference to evolutionary
descent from a common ancestor. The existence of a shared common ancestor
is the necessary criterion for establishing a taxonomic class. Then all descendant
forms, notwithstanding their variation, are placed in the same category.
The ancestral lineage is traced from an approximate point where a distinctive
change or mutation occurs, so that later descendants are identifiably different
from earlier ancestors. Some distinctive features appear and then persist among
descendants, despite the ongoing generation of variation and tree-like divergence.
Hence taxonomy in biology can be accomplished by focusing on a few key
properties. Consider the taxonomic definition of a mammal, noted above. There
are strange boundary cases, such as the duck-billed platypus, which suckles
its young but also lays eggs. But the suckling criterion has been sufficient to
demarcate the whole clade – including marsupials, mice, mammoths, walruses
and whales – from other living things, including reptiles, birds and insects.
This suckling definition does not attempt to describe mammals in more detail,
or to list a host of important common properties. It omits crucial descriptive
characteristics, such as being warm-blooded vertebrates with four limbs, or
having lungs and brains. The suckling criterion is sufficient to demarcate, and
hence it can serve as a taxonomic definition. In general, taxonomic definitions
are neither explanations nor adequate descriptions of classes of entities.6
In biology the formulation of definitional demarcation criteria are facilitated
because the evolution of species is hierarchical or tree-like: when a new species
emerges it diverges from the others, and its members rarely inter-breed across
species boundaries (at least with the capability to produce offspring). Hence
it is typically sufficient to identify distinguishing, characteristic properties that
emerge at the base of a branch of the tree of evolutionary descent.7
6 To illustrate the way in which taxonomic definitions can be updated, note that the mammal clade has
been recently defined in a different way, involving jaws and teeth rather than the suckling of infants. The
leading palaeontologist Tom S. Kemp (2005: 3) defined mammals as ‘synapsids that possess a dentary-
squamosal jaw articulation and occlusion between upper and lower molars with a transverse component
to the movement’. In Kemp’s view, this criterion is sufficient to identify the clade originating with the last
common ancestor of both Sinoconodon (an early type of mammal found as fossils in China) and more
recent mammals. This shift of definition is tied to the need to classify fossils, where mammary glands and
other soft tissue may not have survived. The increasing importance of fossil evidence has led to a new
taxonomic definition.
7 By prominent accounts, the limits of a species are defined in terms of the possibility, or otherwise,
of inter-breeding (de Queiroz, 2005).
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In biology, some hybridization is possible but limited. Hence the hierarchical,
tree-like picture of evolutionary descent is largely preserved. By contrast, in the
social sphere, hybridization and the replication of hybrids is commonplace. For
example, the English language is a fusion of multiple language types, with Latin,
Germanic and other roots. Some prominent legal systems involve combinations
of common and civil law. While some component capitalist institutions (such as
property and markets) may have evolved independently in different locations, we
know that global interactions and institutional borrowings played amajor part in
the emergence and evolution of individual capitalist systems (Hodgson, 2015a).
Institutions that develop in one country or setting are frequently copied and
installed in another. Social evolution widely involves reticulate (with divergence
and much recombination) rather than hierarchic (involving divergence but with
minimal recombination) patterns of descent.
Consequently, most species of social phenomena cannot be conceptualized in
terms of a single, earliest, common ancestor, from which all others in tree-like
formation descend. It is mostly ineffective to follow biology and identify a few
novel features shared by that earliest ancestor and its descendants, and then
use these properties as the definitional criteria. While phylogenetic methods of
classification are often applied to languages and other social phenomena, they
become less effective when there is greater reticulation or recombination.
4. Realist versus nominalist ontological grounds for taxonomic definitions
Because they cannot rely on shared evolutionary descent to perform the
classification, social scientists must look to other grounds for taxonomic
definitions. This opens up a philosophical can of worms. The old philosophical
contest between nominal and realist ontologies becomes relevant. Nominalism
denies the existence of universals. But the realist–nominalist ontological dilemma
is different from the real–nominal dichotomy concerning types of definition.
Aristotle addressed both real and nominal definitions, but from the perspective
of a realist ontology that accepted universals.
By contrast, from a nominalist ontological perspective, all taxonomic
definitions must be regarded as categorizations of convenience that we
impose upon collections of entities. The warrant for any particular taxonomic
classification is that it proves useful for analysis. But this creates a definitional
catch-22. Proposers of definitions must do much analytical and empirical work
before they can claim some warrant for the definition that is proposed. Yet
science requires an analytical and empirical division of labour, and some prior
consensus must be reached on definitions among the researchers involved before
the analytical and empirical work yields some fruit.
A realist ontological approach does not dispense with such difficulties, but
it offers an additional grounding for taxonomic proposals. As Plato reported
of Socrates in Phaedrus, the approach is to ‘carve’ reality ‘where the joint is’.
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This raises the contested Aristotelean concept of essence. Aristotle distinguished
between essential and accidental (or incidental) properties of a kind. As John
O’Neill 1998: 8) put it: ‘The essential properties of an entity of a particular kind
are those properties of the object that it must have if it is to be an object of
that kind.’8 By contrast, an accidental property is one that may be found in the
population of that type, but is not universal for that type. For example, some
humans are characterized by properties that other humans do not possess – such
as blue eyes – so they are ‘accidental’.9
As Aristotle explained in his Metaphysics (Aristotle, 1956), the essence of
what an entity is cannot be adequately defined in terms of what an entity does,
including by the patterns that it generates. If we make this confusion, then we
wrongly imply that when the entity interrupts its characteristic activity, then it
ceases to be such an entity. Sometimes birds fly. But what helps define a bird is the
(existing or ancestral) capacity to fly, not flying itself. If a bird were defined as a
flying animal, then any bird sitting on a branch or pecking on the ground would
cease to be a bird. If a firm were defined as an organization producing goods or
services, then when the workers were on holiday the firm would cease to exist. It
would be better to define a firm as an organization with the capacity to produce
goods or services. The substitution of transient behaviours for dispositions or
capacities is one of the major methodological mistakes in the social sciences.
Definitions or ontologies that are based principally on behaviour cannot cope
with instances where the behaviour radically changes or ceases. But the capacity
to produce the original characteristic behaviour may endure. Although ancient,
this point is not arcane; it is widely utilized inmodern realist philosophy of science
(Bhaskar, 1975; Harre´ and Madden, 1975; Lawson, 1997; Popper, 1990).
From an Aristotelian perspective, the task is to identify aminimum number of
essential properties that can substantiate a taxonomic definition. These particular
essential properties are chosen for their taxonomic effectiveness, not for (say)
descriptive adequacy or causal relevance. Taxonomic definitions are not meant
to be adequate accounts of the essence. Their role is to demarcate, not to describe
adequately or to analyse. An ontological realist would argue, because of reticulate
rather than hierarchic evolutionary descent, taxonomic definition in the social
sciences should refer to essences and choose key elements from those properties.10
8 The word essential is ambiguous. It can refer to something that is part of the essence of a kind, or
to something that is vital to its existence. Here essential refers to part of the essence of a type. Hence, for
the purposes of definition, listing the ‘essential properties of an entity’ does not mean listing all the things
that are vital for its survival.
9 Quine (1960) argued that it was generally difficult and often impossible to disentangle essential
from accidental attributes. See also Robinson (1950: 154–156). But Rasmussen (1984) pointed out that
Quine had shifted the discussion of essences from Aristotle’s species or kinds to a single individual. When
we address species or kinds the distinction between essential and accidental properties becomes clear.
10 While Aristotle’s writing does not seem to be entirely consistent, Demoss and Devereux (1988:
148) cited passages that imply that nominal definitions (of which taxonomic definitions are one type) must
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But Aristotle made a problematic additional assumption, which is relevant
to the treatment of populations. He generally presumed that variations among
species were temporary deviations from one characteristic form. Accordingly, an
Aristotelean definition could appeal to a belief that all varieties were gravitating
to one ‘natural’ type. Elliott Sober (1980) described this as the ‘natural state
model’.
Sober further argued that one of Darwin’s underpinning philosophical
achievements was to abandon the natural state model. His ‘population thinking’
upgraded the treatment of variations from awkward deviations to drivers of
evolutionary selection and change (Mayr, 1972, 1982). But the problem remains
that while biologists can appeal to common evolutionary descent for their
classifications of populations, this device is much impaired in the social sciences,
for reasons given above.
Nevertheless, discussions of (say) enduring varieties of business firms within
industries (Nelson, 1991), or of persistent varieties of capitalism (Hall and
Soskice, 2001), can be interpreted in terms of the abandonment of the natural
state model and the adoption of population thinking (Hodgson, 2016).
Clearly relevant here is the philosophical literature on kinds.11 Taxonomy
involves the identification of a genus or kind. The same nominalist–realist
ontological dilemma remains. Is the world already sorted into kinds and is it
our job to identify and label them? Or, at the other extreme, are kinds simply
categorizations of convenience that we impose upon otherwise-unstructured
observations?
It is possible that classifications themselves will alter the phenomena being
classified. This is sometimes described as reflexivity. In such circumstances Ian
Hacking (1995: 370) wrote: ‘There is a looping or feedback effect involving the
introduction of classifications of people.’ Hacking (1999) referred to ‘interactive
kinds’ within a ‘dynamic nominalism’.12
Richard Boyd (1991) attempted to cope with the problems of fuzziness,
mutability and reflexivity with his notion of ‘homeostatic property cluster kinds’.
Properties of a kind are clustered because they come in an interconnected
package, where shared causal mechanisms engender and help stabilize some
similarity.13 Accordingly, Boyd defended the idea that kinds are real, and not
simply arbitrary conventions of a linguistic community. Amie L. Thomasson
involve essential properties: ‘an account which mentions merely incidental properties of a thing could not
be a nominal definition since it is not an account of what that thing is.’
11 John Locke (1690) and John Stuart Mill (1843) were key contributors (Boyd, 1991; Magnus,
2015).
12 Hacking (1995, 1999) originally suggested that interactive kinds were absent from the natural
world. But Douglas (1986) had already pointed out that interactive kinds are found in nature too.
Hacking (2007) changed his view and became doubtful concerning the notion of kinds.
13 Aristotle’s ‘natural state model’ (Sober, 1980) suggests stronger mechanisms of convergence than
those proposed by Boyd (1991). Boyd’s view seems consistent with a realist and post-Darwinian view
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(2003) developed the notion of ‘institutional kind’, where interactions between
beliefs and social reality are also taken into account.
Given all this, whether from a nominalist or realist ontological perspective,
taxonomic definitions identify the minimum number of properties that are
sufficient to demarcate one group of entities from all other entities. This applies
to taxonomic definitions in both biology and social science, but evolutionary
biology often offers short cuts, via phylogenetic hierarchic descent, that are
often absent in social science.
From a realist ontological viewpoint, the usefulness and persuasiveness of
a taxonomic definition depends in part on whether it points to a subset of
distinguishing properties of a common essence among a population of entities.
They may have a similar causal origins that are worthy of investigation, or they
have correlated properties that support generalizations, even if they do not share
a common ancestry. By contrast, ontological nominalists appeal primarily to
analytical utility and the demonstrated capacity for scientific progress. But in
both cases the proof of the pudding is in the eating.
5. More on the pragmatics of taxonomic definitions
From whatever perspective, taxonomic definitions should be parsimonious. The
efficiency of communication is improved by judicious parsimony, which can
help to form a scientific consensus upon the basic meaning of a term. Parsimony
impels us to establish a minimal list of definitional properties with maximal
effectiveness. Taxonomic definition of a kind cannot include everything that is
vital for the existence of that kind. Such an impractical definitionwould consist of
an unending list of everything required for the entities to function. Furthermore,
the over-extension of the list of definitional properties can spur disagreement
and impair communication. A definition ‘should be empty of assertional content
beyond its ability to explain meaning’ (Belnap, 1993: 122).
Wemust seek some precisionwithwords, to help us dissect amessy reality with
sharp concepts of the mind. Taxonomic definitions point to specific identifying
features: they are not just descriptive lists of attributes. The definer has also to
persuade others that the identification of a particular class of entities (even if well
understood) would point to useful, further theoretical and empirical exploration.
After establishing a taxonomic definition, analysts then have the big job of
understanding the origin, nature, structure, composition, survival, operations
and functions of this type of entity. This larger task is likely to be advanced
further using a division of labour in a scientific community. The taxonomic
definition is a necessary preliminary step for science – to ensure that multiple
analysts are talking about the same thing. Although taxonomic definitions are
of kinds (or species) without Aristotle’s insistence that all variations are aberrations from one form
(Hodgson, 2016).
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affected and updated by ongoing analysis, definition and analysis are different
tasks.
Hence a taxonomic definition of (say) capitalism is not a theoretical analysis
of capitalism. Also a taxonomic definition of capitalism is not a list of
characteristics that are vital for capitalism to exist. A taxonomic definition
may seem simple, but it is not a simplifying assumption. It does not give
us licence to ignore in analysis important properties that do not appear in
the definition.
The kind of definition we require involves a minimal list of characteristics
that can differentiate (say) capitalism from other social formations. Its primary
purpose is to ensure that researchers can communicate their meaning effectively
when using a category such as capitalism. They may not agree on a single
definition, but it is vital to understand what a researcher means by the term
when he or she uses it. This preliminary understanding is necessary before the
researchers try to explain the emergence or functioning of the kind of entity
involved.
The art of taxonomic definition pays attention to the empirical reality
where populations are found and to the previous usages of the terms used to
describe those species. Although formal models may be heuristically useful,
they may over-infuse the process with elements of stipulation that are more
suited to mathematics than taxonomy, and they may divert attention from
the vital empirical material. Taxonomic definitions that derive principally from
mathematical models are often suspect.
Before we move on to some case studies, it will be useful to compare the
idea of a taxonomic definition with Max Weber’s concept of an ideal type.
In a 1904 essay, Weber (1949: 107) argued that conceptual precision was
required not despite but because of the changing, tangled and complex nature
of socio-economic reality: ‘it is because the content of historical concepts is
necessarily subject to change that they must be formulated precisely and clearly
on all occasions.’ Accordingly, real-world muddle was no excuse for a muddled
conceptual model. Clear, fixed concepts were necessary to deal with even a messy
and changing reality. Similar observations apply to taxonomic definitions.
Weberian ideal types must entail basic definitional classifications, but they
amount to much more than taxonomic definitions. They are fuller theoretical
constructions, built for the task of ‘revealing concrete causal phenomena in their
interdependence, their causal conditions and their significance’ (Weber, 1949:
92). Ideal types aid theory construction, after the task of taxonomic demarcation.
The ultimate fruitfulness of an ideal type must depend on its success in locating
and revealing significant causal linkages in the phenomenon under investigation.
This is way beyond the task of taxonomic definition, although it depends upon
it. Taxonomic definitions are vital to identify a type. But when that type is
identified it is necessary to examine how entities are causally constituted and
how they interact.
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While ideal types and a taxonomic definitions are different, they both have
some fixity in the face of potentially turbulent complexity. Taxonomic definitions
and ideal types both must be as distinct as possible, despite the messiness and
turbulence of social reality.14
6. First example: defining firms
From about 1945 to 1990, the theory of the firm was a burgeoning and exciting
area of research in economics. After a debate on how the goals of the firm
should be modelled (Machlup, 1967), theorists began to look more at the firm’s
structure and try to explain its nature and performance (Alchian and Demsetz,
1972; Cheung, 1983; Fama, 1980; Hart andMoore, 1990; Jensen andMeckling,
1976; Williamson, 1975). But progress slowed and there has been relatively little
theoretical development in this area since 2000.15
A major problem is that economists cannot agree what a firm is. Different
arguments for the existence and productivity of the firm often cannot readily be
tested conjointly, partly because of a lack of clear definitions. The institutional
economist Thra´inn Eggertsson (1990: 158) noted that the lack of standardized
vocabulary and careful definitions made it ‘difficult to see whether we are dealing
with overlapping or competing theories’. This is a chronic problemwith empirical
work on the theory of the firm (Carter and Hodgson, 2006).
Leading economists argued that a definition should not even be attempted.
Fritz Machlup (1967: 26) listed no less than ten ‘concepts of the firm employed
in the literature of business and economics’, and suggested that even more were
in use. He argued that the firm had been regarded as an organization, a decision-
making system, a collection of assets and liabilities, a juridical person, a business
unit under a single management, and much more besides. Machlup (1967: 28)
then concluded:
This exercise should have succeeded in showing how ludicrous the efforts of
some writers are to attempt one definition of the firm in economic analysis
. . . I hope that there will be no argument about which concept of the firm is
the most important or the most useful. Since they serve different purposes,
such an argument would be pointless.
But this is a non sequitur. The proposition that several different ‘concepts
of the firm’ exist does not imply that the formulation and promotion of one
best definition should be abandoned. On the contrary, it could be argued that
the very confusion itself calls out for a single, commonly accepted taxonomic
14 For critical discussions of Weberian ideal types see Commons (1934), Hindess (1977), Machlup
(1978) and Hodgson (2001).
15 Among the foremost 20 results from a Google Scholar search using ‘theory of the firm’ (performed
28 May 2017), only four items were from 2000 or later. Only one of these four was from a leading
mainstream journal of economics.
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definition. Machlup rightly pointed out that these different concepts ‘serve
different purposes’. But it did not occur to him that these different definitions
might also point to different things. A (legal) firm is not the same thing as a
business unit, or a collection of assets, or a production plant. These are not
simply different concepts: they are different entities. Accordingly, we require
a plurality of concepts to refer to a plurality of real arrangements. Machlup
was more aware than many economists of the philosophical issues entailed in
conceptual exegesis, but he made little acknowledgement of the nature and role
of different kinds of definition and their importance for scientific progress.
Steven Cheung (1983: 17–18) argued that any definition of the firm is
subjective and arbitrary: ‘according to one’s view a “firm” may be as small as
a relationship between two input owners or, if the chain of contracts is allowed
to spread, as big as the whole economy.’ He then concluded: ‘Thus it is futile to
press the issue of what is or is not a firm.’ Cheung’s argument was basically this:
because different definitions of X are possible, it is futile to define X. But this too
is a non sequitur. If different taxonomic definitions exist, then to communicate
we have to make clear the one we have chosen rather than abandon definitions
altogether. Cheung showed no appreciation of the fact that shared taxonomic
definitions are vital for scientific communication and development. His subjective
and arbitrary view of definition is inconsistent with an understanding of science
as a social process, requiring conceptual demarcations and shared understandings
of terms.
Other researchers point to new organizational firms, new organizational
structures, business networks, extended outsourcing, and so on, and then
suggest that defining the firm is misconceived because of the new reality. But
as Weber (1949: 106–107) argued, the messiness or changeability of reality
makes conceptual precision all the more vital. To understand variety or change,
we need clear reference points.
One taxonomic category – the firm – is obviously insufficient. We need
additional concepts such as business unit, production plant and conglomerate
to describe other important structures in the business world. Multiple concepts
are required to describe multiple types of entity. But we still need taxonomic
categories to help define what we are talking about.
There is a related controversy about what are described as firm–market
hybrids. Assuming such hybrids exist, we would still need some definition of
firm and market to understand them.
But because no consensus definition of the firm was established, its identity
began to slip away. Oliver Williamson (1991: 271) saw hierarchies (or firms)
as ‘a continuation of market relations by other means’. Instead of the firm–
market dichotomy (as in Coase, 1937), Williamson eventually adopted a
firm–market continuum, wherein the firm became a mutation of the market.
Richard Langlois (1995: 72) observed that research in this area ‘has reached
the conclusion that the distinction between firm and market is little more than
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semantics’. It seemed that the firm had lost its identity: it could be treated as an
extended market.
We may speculate that one reason why innovative research into ‘the theory of
the firm’ has slowed down dramatically may be this failure to establish a shared
taxonomic definition of the central object of analysis. The term firm is still in
widespread use – to refer vaguely to some site where production takes place –
but there is no consensus on its meaning or boundaries. This is an example of
the failure of taxonomic definition, and of some of the possible consequences.16
7. Second example: defining markets
This next case study is not about a refusal or failure to define, but it concerns
arguments for a single particular definition among others. Definitions generally
vary in their broadness and historical specificity, and conceptions of the market
are no different in this regard. The primary problem here is not the rebuttal of
definition in principle, but a failure to agree on the broadness or narrowness of
the taxonomic category.
Some choose to define markets very broadly. Ludwig von Mises (1949: 257)
defined the market economy as ‘the social system of the division of labour under
private ownership of the means of production’. Here the historical boundaries
of the market depend on what is meant by ‘private ownership’. He defined
ownership in terms of control of the services that derive from a good, rather
than in terms of legal rights. Mises (1949: 97) saw all action, even by an
isolated individual, as ‘exchange’ – as an attempt to swap inferior for superior
circumstances. Hence private ownership and exchange could apply to most of
human history and even to solitary actors that do not contract with others. This
extremely broad conception of the market embraced all voluntary transfers or
transformations of assets.
But this extremely inclusive definition undermined Mises’ normative
arguments about the superiority of markets. If markets characterize most of
human existence, then arguments in their favour have less significance and
leverage (Rosenbaum, 2000).
A narrower taxonomic definition of market might emanate from a narrower
conception of exchange, which relied on something resembling enforceable
contracts. Themarketwould then be synonymous with trade in general. Trading
in commodities has been going on for tens of thousands of years.
16 It is beyond the scope of this essay to try to fill the void and establish a viable definition of
the firm. But it has been suggested that criteria concerning legal personality or agency could be used
to delineate firms from non-firms (Deakin et al., 2017; Gindis, 2009, 2016; Hodgson, 2015a). This
approach confines the firm to spheres where meaningful and effective legal systems are in operation. This
is a narrow definition, but not as narrow as some others. For example, Coase’s (1937) classic (but later
abandoned) definition of the firm in terms of employment relations excluded worker-owned cooperatives
and single-person enterprises.
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A further definitional narrowing is possible. Should the market be regarded
as coextensive with the contractual exchange of goods or services per se, or
given an even narrower meaning and used to refer to forms of organized,
recurrent exchange activity? Minimization of stipulation requires a definition
of a market that is close to its everyday (lexical) meaning – a place with regular,
organized exchanges of goods or services. This suggests a narrow definition, with
a relatively sharp historical, institutional and analytical focus.
A market originally referred to a specific place where people gathered and
exchanges of particular kinds of commodity occurred. The markets in China in
about 3000 BC and in Athens and theMiddle East in the sixth century BC involved
recurrent trade organized in specific locations (Hodgson, 2015a). Originally
permitted by royal charters, medieval markets in England and elsewhere were
located and regulated in specific towns. There are also permanent buildings that
function as ‘markets’ or ‘exchanges’ for agricultural products, minerals, financial
stocks and so on. Although today it has acquired additional meanings, the term
‘market’ still refers to places where trade is organized.
It is on narrowly defined markets, with repeated trades in goods or services
of a similar type, that price signals become more meaningful. The operation of
the law of one price (where similar items at similar times and locations have
similar prices) is sometimes taken as an indication of the existence of a market.
The organized competition of the market and its associated information facilities
are necessary institutional conditions for any gravitation by similar items to a
similar price level.
The narrow definition usefully distinguishes between forms of trade that do
and do not take place in markets. Many real-world commercial transactions
do not take place in competitive market arenas (Dore, 1983; Goldberg, 1980;
Richardson, 1972). Instead firms are involved in ongoing and more intensive
bilateral relationships: the parties cooperate and exchange relevant information
before or after the contract itself. This is often described as ‘relational exchange’
or ‘relational contracting’. It is very different from the more impersonal and
competitive exchanges found in organized markets.
Modern electronic communication makes it possible to organize markets that
are unconfined by any physical location. Bidders can communicate with other
traders and the market organizers over long distances, as well as with many
financial markets. The market-place can disappear, as in the case of Internet-
based markets such as eBay. These are markets, even by a narrow definition,
because they involve ongoing, high-volume trade and are subject to organized
procedures and rules.
The market may be defined narrowly in the following taxonomic terms:
a market is an institution through which multiple buyers or multiple sellers
recurrently exchange rights to a substantial number of similar goods or services
of a particular type. Markets involve multiple exchanges, with multiple buyers
or multiple sellers, and thereby a degree of competition. Markets involve
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legal and other rules that help structure, organize and legitimize exchange
transactions. Markets, in short, are organized and institutionalized recurrent
exchange. According to this narrow definition, not all trade takes place
on markets.
But it is often difficult to draw the line between organized and relational
exchange, withmany possible intermediate cases. Such definitional difficulties are
typical when dealing with highly varied phenomena. But the difficulty of defining
a species does not mean that the species should be undefined. The boundaries of
the class of market entities are fuzzy. We may even wish to consider ‘degrees of
marketness’ (Block, 1990; Rosenbaum, 2000).
Even if we choose a broader definition, there are phenomena that we should
avoid describing as markets. For example, following Aaron Director (1964),
Ronald Coase (1974) and Coase and Ning Wang, 2012: 190–207) advocated
a ‘market for ideas’. Does this literally mean that full property rights in ideas
should be established (as with goods) and that ideas should all become priced
and traded on a market? Not so. We have ideas, but we do not necessarily
own them in a legal sense. Coase and Wang referred principally to the need
for ‘freedom of speech and expression’ and for ‘the creation and transmission
of knowledge’ through educational institutions. By misleadingly describing all
this as a ‘market’, Coase devalued his insistence elsewhere on the importance of
property, and on the non-universality of the price mechanism.
Nevertheless, substantial work in economics and sociology has focused on
real-work markets and examined their relations and dynamics.17
8. Third example: defining institutions
The third case study concerns a term where there is a near-consensus over its
definition. The above discussion of taxonomic definitions defuses attempts to
disturb this emerging consensus.
The depiction of institutions as socially operative (rather thanmerely declared)
systems of rules is prominent in the literature on the topic.18 But some issues
remain that require clarification. And there are some rival definitions, notably
where institutions are regarded as equilibria, particularly in terms of game theory
(Aoki, 2001; Binmore, 1994, 1998; Lewis, 1969).
Frank Hindriks and Francesco Guala (Guala, 2016; Hindriks and Guala,
2015) attempted to synthesize the rule-based and equilibrium-based conceptions.
17 For a selection see Baker (1984), Ha¨rdle and Kirman (1995), McMillan (2002) and Mirowski
(2007).
18 See for example Rowe (1989), North (1990), Ostrom (1990), Knight (1992), Crawford andOstrom
(1995) and Mantzavinos (2001). But Mantzavinos (2006) argued that disputes over definitions of terms
like institution fall into an ‘essentialist trap’, and that researchers should concentratemore on explanations.
However, contrary to Mantzavinos, the adoption of nominalist definitions rebuts neither ontological
realism nor essentialism.
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They develop a ‘rules in equilibrium’ approach. Their principal argument against
the exclusively rule-based approach is that it does not explain why rules are
followed, or why they remain stable.
But it is not the task of a taxonomic definition to explain why
things work, or even to signal the type of explanation that would be
required. The work of Guala and Hindriks is more concerned with
understanding the general nature of institutions, rather than defining them
in a taxonomic sense (Hodgson, 2015b). As the definition of a mammal
illustrates, taxonomic definitions should be as parsimonious as possible, while
retaining effective demarcation criteria. The addition of the equilibrium concept
may be important for explanatory purposes but it is unnecessary for a
taxonomic definition.19
Hindriks and Guala make an important contribution to the debate about the
nature of institutions. But for the primary taxonomic purpose of agreeing on
what the debate is about, the ‘systems of rules’ definition is adequate. Adding
additional clauses such as ‘in equilibrium’ to the taxonomic definition would
create more controversy than is necessary at the primary stage. After common
agreement on the object of analysis, their important argument about how rules
are sustained and enforced comes into play.
The rule-based definition is still effective and meaningful in demarcatory
terms. For example, social theorists typically define social structures as sets of
relations between individuals (Porpora, 1987). Consequently, all institutions
are social structures, but not all social structures are institutions. For example,
the demographic or gender structure of a society is part of its social structure;
but they are not necessarily systems of rules, and hence they are not
institutions. The ‘systems of rules’ definition of an institution does the job
of excluding these important non-institutional phenomena: it is an effective
demarcation device.
Hindriks and Guala rightly point out that rules must be more than mere
declarations to serve as the constituent elements of institutions. But this issue
can be addressed in the definition and analysis of the rule itself (Crawford and
Ostrom, 1995; Epstein, 2015; Searle, 1995, 2005). Ludwig Wittgenstein (1958)
emphasized ‘that what constitutes a rule is our collective use of it; rule-following
is a general practice established by agreement, custom, and training’ (Grayling,
1988: 80). The definition and nature of a rule are vital additional questions, and
not necessarily part of the taxonomic definition of an institution that refers to
rules.
19 It is also possible to question the use of the equilibrium concept in explanatory terms. For example,
if an institution is briefly destabilized, such as during a revolution leading to a change of monarch, then
that does not necessarily mean that the institution of monarchy ceases to exist. Note also that in uses
of game theory to analyse institutions (Schotter, 1981; Binmore, 1994, 1998, Aoki, 2001) the resulting
game equilibria themselves establish rules. For example, with the coordination game of driving-on-the-left
versus driving-on-the-right, the two possible equilibria are both (regulative) rules.
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The rules that constitute institutions include norms of behaviour and social
conventions as well as legal rules.20 Accordingly, systems of language, money,
law, weights and measures, traffic conventions, table manners and organizations
are institutions. But not all institutions are organizations. For example, language
is an institution but not an organization.
Some have expressed uneasiness with this broad taxonomic definition of
institution, which includes so many different things, from languages to political
structures. Are such capacious definitions flawed? If so, the definitions of a
mammal, an animal or a tree might also have to be rejected as overly capacious.
On the contrary, instead of a rejection of the primary classification, capacious
outcomes point to the need for subclassification and further differentiation.
Consider another problem. It is widely accepted by leading scholars (Giddens,
1984; Guala, 2016; Miller, 2010; Parsons, 1983; Scott, 1995) that organizations
are a special form of institution. Despite this, North is often attributed with a
definition of institutions that excludes organizations. In key passages that are
cited in support of this claim, North (1990: 3–5; 1994: 361) did not make it
sufficiently clear whether he was defining organizations as players or treating
organizations as players as an analytic abstraction. This has created much
confusion, with some of his readers insisting that organizations should be defined
as players.
But in personal correspondence – reproduced in Hodgson (2006) – North
indicated that he treated organizations as players for the purpose of macro-
analysis of the socio-economic system as a whole, and that he did not regard
organizations as the same thing as players in all circumstances.21 In saying that
‘organizations are players’, North was making an abstraction for particular
analytic purposes, rather than defining organizations in this way. The scarcity
of discussion in social science about the nature and role of definitions has
contributed to this confusion.
An organization may be defined as a special type institution that also involves
(1) criteria to establish its boundaries and to distinguish members from non-
members, (2) principles of sovereignty concerning who is in charge and (3) a
structure delineating responsibilities within the organization. These conditions
20 The ambiguous terminology of formal versus informal institutions is often deployed but much
less often defined. Sometimes ‘formal’ is intended to mean codified. Others use it to mean designed. Still
others use it to refer to laws. Given this confusion, the intended meaning of these terms should always be
clarified.
21 North et al. (2009: 15) seemed to contradict this. They wrote: ‘In contrast to institutions,
organizations consist of specific groups of individuals pursuing a mix of common and individual goals
through partially coordinated behavior.’ If they had put ‘In contrast to other institutions, organizations
. . . ’ then the contradiction would have disappeared. But then North et al. 2009: 16) went on to say that
‘most organizations have their own internal institutional structure’, which confusingly suggested that most
organizations contain institutions. Incidentally it is misleading to define organizations as ‘specific groups
of individuals’ because individuals often leave or enter organizations without organizations changing their
identity (Epstein, 2015).
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imply the existence of social roles or positions that have properties irreducible
to those who occupy them.
9. Conclusion
The aim of this paper has been to reinforce our understanding of the nature
and importance of taxonomic definitions in social science. There are several
different types of definition, and among them taxonomic definitions play a
vital role. They are relevant in regard to particular real-world (ontological)
circumstances, where scientists necessarily operate within epistemic communities
involving communication and shared understandings (Kitcher, 1993).
From a realist ontological perspective, the circumstances to which taxonomic
definitions apply involve populations of entities of one type or species, which vary
among themselves in important respects, but retain some essential properties in
common. Such populations or species are found in both the social and biotic
worlds. Classificatory problems, emanating from fuzzy boundaries and changes
in populations through time, are ubiquitous.
In biology, taxonomic definitions can sometimes rely on the tree-like
descent and division of species. But in the social sciences, because of rampant
hybridization and reticulate patterns of descent, this device is generally ruled out.
It is suggested above that the Aristotelean notion of essence can be useful in such
difficult circumstances to help devise taxonomic definitions. These then become
a minimal list of definitional properties that can serve to differentiate one kind
of entity from another.
Whether we take a realist view that taxonomic definitions somehow relate to
essences, or a nominalist view that they are no more than instruments of thought,
taxonomic definitions are crucial for empirical and theoretical enquiry. They are
vital for communication between scientists as primary devices to establish a
shared understanding of what objects of analysis are being addressed.
Although further analysis may lead scientists to alter their basic definitions
(as well as the more routine tasks of subclassification) taxonomic definition
and analysis are different tasks, but some progress with the former is always a
precondition of the latter. Because of the need to communicate, and to minimize
dispute over basic ideas that are necessary for scientific cooperation, taxonomic
definitions should be parsimonious.
Three case studies illustrate different sorts of problems in this area. They
highlight different degrees of consensus on workable taxonomic definitions.
But these problems are not confined to these cases. Unfortunately they are
widespread.
The first case study highlights a failure to establish a shared taxonomic
definition of a firm, alongside influential but misguided warnings that such a
definition should not even be attempted. This hiatus may have prevented the
crucial formation of consensus over meaning and impaired further development
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after an illuminating outburst of energy and conjecture that had ebbed away by
the year 2000.
The second case involves a range of taxonomic alternatives, in this instance
over the meaning of the term market. A case is made for a narrow definition,
where trade is a broader category and markets are a special case, involving
organized and recurrent exchanges. Nevertheless, it is possible to make progress
with a broader definition alongside the narrower one, as long as the chosen
meaning is made clear and explicit.
The third case involves the definition of the term institution. Unlikemany other
terms in the social sciences, there is a near-consensus on a taxonomic definition in
this instance. But some confusions and important disagreements on ontological
issues remain (Epstein, 2015; Guala, 2016; Miller, 2010). Nevertheless, there
has been sufficient taxonomic consensus over the object of analysis to enable
considerable advance. This in turn may open up a vista of more extensive and
well-grounded empirical enquiry, spanning multiple academic disciplines.
References
Abercrombie, N., S. Hill and B. S. Turner (2000), The Penguin Dictionary of Sociology (4th
edn), London: Penguin.
Alchian, A. A. and H. Demsetz (1972), “Production, Information Costs, and Economic
Organization,” American Economic Review, 62: 777–795.
Aoki, M. (2001) Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Aristotle, (1853), The Organon, or Logical Treatises of Aristotle, translated and introduced
by Octavius Freire Owen, 2 vols, London: Bohn.
Aristotle, (1901),Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, translated E. S. Bouchier, Oxford: Blackwell.
Aristotle, (1956),Metaphysics, edited and translated by JohnWarringtonwith an introduction
by W. D. Ross, London: Dent.
Baker,W. E. (1984), “The Social Structure of aNational SecuritiesMarket,”American Journal
of Sociology, 89: 775–811.
Belnap, N. D. (1993), On Rigorous Definitions, Philosophical Studies, 72: 115–146.
Bhaskar, R. (1975), A Realist Theory of Science. Leeds: Leeds Books.
Binmore, K. (1994), Playing Fair: Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume I,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Binmore, K. (1998), Just Playing: Game Theory and the Social Contract. Volume 2,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Block, F. (1990), Postindustrial Possibilities: A Critique of Economic Discourse, Berkeley:
University of California Press.
Bowker, G. C. and S. L. Star (1999), Sorting Things Out: Classification and Its Consequences,
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Boyd, R. (1991), “Realism, Anti-Foundationalism, and the Enthusiasm for Natural Kinds,”
Philosophical Studies, 61: 127–148.
Carter, R. and G. M. Hodgson (2006), “The Impact of Empirical Tests of Transaction Cost
Economics on the Debate on the Nature of the Firm,” Strategic Management Journal,
27: 461–476.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137418000334
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Loughborough University, on 16 Apr 2019 at 10:21:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Journal of Institutional Economics 229
Cheung, S. N. S. (1983), “The Contractual Nature of the Firm,” Journal of Law and
Economics, 26: 1–21.
Cliff, T. (1955), Stalinist Russia: A Marxist Analysis, London: Michael Kidron.
Coase, R. H. (1937), “The Nature of the Firm,” Economica, 4, New Series,
386–405.
Coase, R. H. (1974), “The Market for Goods and the Market for Ideas,” American Economic
Review (Papers and Proceedings), 64: 384–391.
Coase, R. H. and N. Wang (2012), How China Became Capitalist, London and New York:
Palgrave Macmillan.
Commons, J. R. (1934), Institutional Economics – Its Place in Political Economy, New York:
Macmillan.
Cook, R. T. (2009), “Intensional Definition,” in R. T. Cook (2009), A
Dictionary of Philosophical Logic, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press,
p. 155.
Crawford, S. E. S. and E. Ostrom (1995), “A Grammar of Institutions,” American Political
Science Review 89: 582–600.
De Queiroz, K. (1994), “Replacement of an Essentialistic Perspective on Taxonomic
Definitions as Exemplified by the Definition of ‘Mammalia’,” Systematic Biology, 43:
497–510.
De Queiroz, K. (2005), “Ernst Mayr and the Modern Concept of Species,” Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 102 (supplement), 6600–6607.
Deakin, S., D. Gindis, G. M. Hodgson, Huang, K. and Pistor, K. (2017), “Legal
Institutionalism: Capitalism and the Constitutive Role of Law,” Journal of Comparative
Economics, 45: 188–200.
Demoss, D. and Devereux, D. (1988), “Essence, Existence, and Nominal Definition in
Aristotle’s “Posterior Analytics” II 8–10’, Phronesis, 33: 133–154.
Director, A. (1964), “The Parity of the Economic Market Place,” Journal of Law and
Economics, 7: 1–10.
Dore, R. (1983), “Goodwill and the Spirit ofMarket Capitalism,”British Journal of Sociology,
34: 459–482.
Douglas, M. T. (1986), How Institutions Think (London and Syracuse: Routledge & Kegan
Paul and Syracuse University Press).
Durlauf, S. N. and L. E. Blume (eds) (2008), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics,
2nd edition, London and New York: Palgrave.
Eggertsson, T. (1990),Economic Behavior and Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Epstein, B. (2015), The Ant Trap: Rebuilding the Foundations of the Social Sciences, Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press.
EU Council (2008), “EU Council Regulation (EC) No 479/2008 of 29 April 2008, Annex
IV,” Official Journal of the European Union. Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:148:0001:0061:en:PDF (accessed 13 May
2018).
Fama, E. F. (1980), “Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm,” Journal of Political
Economy, 88: 288–307.
Fodor, J. A. (1998),Concepts: Where Cognitive Science WentWrong, Oxford and New York:
Oxford University Press.
Fodor, J. A., M. F. Garrett, E. C. T. Walker and C. H. Parkes (1980), “Against Definitions,”
Cognition, 8: 263–267.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137418000334
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Loughborough University, on 16 Apr 2019 at 10:21:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
230 GEOFFREY M. HODGSON
Frege, G. (1914), “Logic in Mathematics,” in H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, and F. Kaulbach (eds)
(1979),Gottlob Frege: Posthumous Writings, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp.
203–250.
Frigg, R. and Nguyen, J. (2017), “Models and Representation’ in L.Magnani and T. Bertolotti
(eds) Springer Handbook of Model-Based Science, Berlin: Springer, pp. 49–102.
Giddens, A. (1984), The Constitution of Society: Outline of the Theory of Structuration,
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gindis, D. (2009), “From Fictions and Aggregates to Real Entities in the Theory of the Firm,”
Journal of Institutional Economics, 5: 25–46.
Gindis, D. (2016), “Legal Personhood and the Firm: Avoiding Anthropomorphism and
Equivocation,” Journal of Institutional Economics, 12: 499–513.
Godfrey-Smith, P. (2009), Darwinian Populations and Natural Selection, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Goldberg, V. P. (1980), “Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts,”
American Behavioral Scientist, 23: 337–352.
Grayling, A. C. (1988), Wittgenstein, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Guala, F. (2016),Understanding Institutions: The Science and Philosophy of Living Together,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hacking, I. (1983), Representing and Intervening: Introductory Topics in the Philosophy of
Science, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hacking, I. (1995), “The Looping Effect of Human Kinds,” in D. Sperber, D. Premack and
A. J. Premack (eds) (1995), Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Debate, Oxford:
Clarendon Press, pp. 351–383.
Hacking, I. (1999), The Social Construction of What? Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Hacking, I. (2007), “Kinds of People: Rosy Dawn, Scholastic Twilight,” Royal Institute of
Philosophy Supplement, 61: 203–239.
Hall, P. A. and Soskice, D. (eds) (2001),Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations
of Comparative Advantage, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Harari, O. (2005), Knowledge and Demonstration: Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, London
and New York: Springer.
Ha¨rdle, W. K. and A. P. Kirman (1995), “Nonclassical Demand: A Model-Free Examination
of Price Quantity Relations in the Marseille Fish Market,” Journal of Econometrics,
67: 227–257.
Harre´, R. and E. H. Madden (1975), Causal Powers: A Theory of Natural Necessity, Oxford:
Basil Blackwell.
Hart, O. D. and Moore, J. H. (1990), “Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm,” Journal
of Political Economy, 98: 1119–11158.
Hempel, C. G. (1952), Fundamentals of Concept Formation in Empirical Science, Chicago:
Chicago University Press.
Hindess, B. (1977), Philosophy and Methodology in the Social Sciences, Brighton: Harvester.
Hindriks, F. and F. Guala (2015), “Institutions, Rules, and Equilibria: A Unified Theory,”
Journal of Institutional Economics, 11: 459–480.
Hobbes, T. (1651), Leviathan or The Matter, Forme and Power of a Common Wealth
Ecclesiasticall and Civil, London: Andrew Crooke.
Hodgson, G. M. (2001), How Economics Forgot History: The Problem of Historical
Specificity in Social Science, London and New York: Routledge.
Hodgson, G. M. (2006), “What Are Institutions?” Journal of Economic Issues, 40: 1–25.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137418000334
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Loughborough University, on 16 Apr 2019 at 10:21:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Journal of Institutional Economics 231
Hodgson, G. M. (2014), “What is Capital? Economists and Sociologists have changed its
Meaning – Should it be Changed Back?” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 38: 1063–
1086.
Hodgson, G. M. (2015a), Conceptualizing Capitalism: Institutions, Evolution, Future,
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Hodgson, G. M. (2015b), “On Defining Institutions: Rules versus Equilibria,” Journal of
Institutional Economics, 11: 499–505.
Hodgson, G. M. (2016), “Varieties of Capitalism: Some Philosophical and Historical
Considerations,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, 40: 941–960.
Hyde, D. (2008), Vagueness, Logic and Ontology, Aldershot: Ashgate.
Jary, D. and J. Jary (eds) (1991), The Harper Collins Dictionary of Sociology, New York:
Harper Collins.
Jensen,M. C. andMeckling,W. H. (1976), “Theory of the Firm:Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure,” Journal of Financial Economics, 3: 305–360.
Kemp, T. S. (2005), The Origin and Evolution of Mammals, Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press.
Kitcher, P. (1993), The Advancement of Science: Science without Legend, Objectivity without
Illusions, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Kitcher, P. (2012), Preludes to Pragmatism: Towards a Reconstruction of Philosophy, Oxford
and New York: Oxford University Press.
Klaes, M. (2004), “Evolutionary Economics: In Defence of ‘Vagueness’,” Journal of Economic
Methodology, 11: 359–376.
Klaes,M. (2006), “Founding Economic Concepts,” Storio del Pensiero Economico, new series,
3: 21–37.
Knight, J. (1992), Institutions and Social Conflict, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Langlois, R. N. (1995), “Capabilities and Coherence in Firms and Markets,” in
C. A. Montgomery (ed.) (1995), Resource-Based and Evolutionary Theories of the
Firm: Towards a Synthesis, Boston: Kluwer, pp. 71–100.
Lawson, T. (1997), Economics and Reality, London and New York: Routledge.
Lewis, D. (1969), Convention: A Philosophical Study, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press
Locke, J. (1690), An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, London: Basset.
Machlup, F. (1963), Essays in Economic Semantics, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Machlup, F. (1967), “Theories of the Firm: Marginalist, Behavioral, Managerial,” American
Economic Review, 57: 1–33.
Machlup, F. (1978),Methodology of Economics andOther Social Sciences, London: Academic
Press.
Magnus, P. D. (2015), “John Stuart Mill on Taxonomy and Natural Kinds,” HOPOS:
Journal of the International Society for the History and Philosophy of Science, 5:
269–280.
Malthus, T. R. (1827), Definitions in Political Economy, London: John Murray.
Mantzavinos, C. (2001), Individuals, Institutions, and Markets, Cambridge and New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Mantzavinos, C. (2006), “The Role of Definitions in Institutional Analysis,” Wettbewerb
und Gesundheitswesen: Konzeptionen und Felder ordnungso¨konomischen Denkens,
Schriftenreihe Adra´ssy Universita¨t, Band 4, Budapest, pp. 85–92.
Marshall, A. (1920), Principles of Economics: An Introductory Volume (8th edn), London:
Macmillan.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137418000334
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Loughborough University, on 16 Apr 2019 at 10:21:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
232 GEOFFREY M. HODGSON
Marshall, G. (ed.) (1998), Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, Oxford and New York: Oxford
University Press.
Mayr, E. (1972), “The Nature of the Darwinian Revolution,” Science, 176: 981–989.
Mayr, E. (1982), The Growth of Biological Thought: Diversity, Evolution, and Inheritance,
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
McCloskey, Deirdre N. (2010), Bourgeois Dignity: Why Economics Can’t Explain the
Modern World, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
McCloskey, Donald N. (1985), The Rhetoric of Economics, Madison, WI: University of
Wisconsin Press.
McMillan, J. (2002), Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets, New York and
London: Norton.
Mill, J. S. (1843), A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, Being a Connected View of
the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, 2 vols (1st edn),
London: Longman, Green, Reader and Dyer.
Miller, S. (2010), The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions: A Philosophical Study,
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Mirowski, P. (2007), “Markets Come to Bits: Evolution, Computation and Markomata
in Economic Science,” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 63:
209–242.
Mises, L. von (1949), Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (1st edn), London and New
Haven: William Hodge and Yale University Press.
Morgan, M. S. (2012), TheWorld in a Model: How Economists Work and Think, Cambridge
and New York: Cambridge University Press.
Nelson, R. R. (1991), “Why Do Firms Differ, and How Does it Matter?” Strategic
Management Journal, 12, Special Issue, 61–74.
North, D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance,
Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
North, D. C. (1994), “Economic Performance through Time,” American Economic Review,
84: 359–367.
North, D. C., J. J. Wallis and B. R. Weingast (2009), Violence and Social Orders: A
Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History, Cambridge and
New York: Cambridge University Press.
O’Neill, J. (1998), The Market: Ethics, Knowledge and Politics, London and New York:
Routledge.
Ostrom, E. (1990), Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Outhwaite, W. and T. Bottomore (1994), The Blackwell Dictionary of Twentieth Century
Thought, Oxford: Blackwell.
Parsons, T. (1983), On Institutions and Social Evolution: Selected Writings, with an
introduction by Leon H. Mayhew, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Popper, K. R. (1990), A World of Propensities, Bristol: Thoemmes.
Porpora, D. V. (1987), The Concept of Social Structure, New York and London: Greenwood
Press.
Quine, W. v. O. (1960), Word and Object, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Rasmussen, D. B. (1984), “Quine and Aristotelian Essentialism,” The New Scholasticism, 58:
316–335.
Richardson, G. B. (1972), “The Organisation of Industry,” Economic Journal, 82: 883–896.
Robinson, R. (1950), Definition, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137418000334
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Loughborough University, on 16 Apr 2019 at 10:21:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Journal of Institutional Economics 233
Rosenbaum, E. F. (2000), “What is a Market? On the Methodology of a Contested Concept,”
Review of Social Economy, 58: 455–482.
Rowe, N. (1989), Rules and Institutions, London: Philip Allan.
Runciman, W. G. (1983), “Capitalism without Classes: The Case of Classical Rome,” British
Journal of Sociology 34: 157–181.
Russell, B. (1923), “Vagueness,” Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, 1: 84–
92.
Scott, W. R. (1995), Institutions and Organizations, Thousand Oaks, CA and London: Sage.
Searle, J. R. (1995), The Construction of Social Reality, London: Allen Lane.
Searle, J. R. (2005), “What is an Institution?’ Journal of Institutional Economics, 1, 1–22.
Schotter, A. R. (1981), The Economic Theory of Social Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Sober, E. (1980), “Evolution, Population Thinking and Essentialism,” Philosophy of Science,
47: 350–383.
Thomasson, A. L. (2003), “Realism and Human Kinds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 67: 580–609.
Weber, M. (1949), Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences, Glencoe, IL: Free
Press.
Whitehead, A. N. (1929), Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Williams, R. (1976), Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society, Glasgow: Fontana.
Williamson, O. E. (1975), Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Anti-Trust Implications: A
Study in the Economics of Internal Organization, New York: Free Press.
Williamson, O. E. (1991), “Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete
Structural Alternatives,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 36: 269–296.
Wittgenstein, L. (1958), Philosophical Investigations (2nd edn), Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Zadeh., L. A. (1996), “Fuzzy Logic = Computing with Words,” IEEE Transactions on Fuzzy
Systems, 4: 103–111.
Cite this article: Hodgson GM (2018). Taxonomic definitions in social science, with firms, markets
and institutions as case studies. Journal of Institutional Economics 0, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1744137418000334
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1744137418000334
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Loughborough University, on 16 Apr 2019 at 10:21:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
